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This study examines whether the EU, the world’s largest importer, exercises market power over 
soybean imports.  Results, based on 1975-2000 data, suggest that the EU has practiced price 
discrimination against imports from Argentina and Brazil.  The evidence for the practice of 
pricing-to-market based on exchange rate changes is mixed.  
 
Introduction 
The level of competition in the international market for soybean products has consistently 
generated considerable interest among researchers and stakeholders (governments, producers and 
investors) worldwide.  Earlier studies have shown that the soybean export market, dominated by 
Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, is perfectly competitive (Pick and Pack, 1991; Larson 
and Rask, 1992; Deodhar and Sheldon, 1997; Schnepf, Doblman and Bolling, 2001). During the 
last two decades, the soybean processing industry has become increasingly consolidated, with 70 
percent of soybean processing handled by less than ten major firms (Marion and Kim, 1991; 
Scoppola, 1995).  The European Union (EU), which has become the world’s largest economic 
entity, holds discernible shares in both the import and export of soybeans and soybean products. 
Since its establishment in 1957 with six members, the EU doubled its membership in 
1986 when Spain and Portugal joined.  Austria, Finland, and Sweden were granted membership 
in 1995.  The current fifteen members are developed, high-income countries with estimated total 
Gross Domestic Product of $9.46 billion in 2000, 15 percent higher than that of the U.S.  In 
December 2002, the EU welcomed ten additional countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta.  When the voters of 
these countries ratify the membership, the EU will consist of 25 countries including half a billion 
people.    2 
The objective of this study is to determine whether market power is exercised in the 
world soybeans import market.  This is particularly important and relevant because being the 
world’s largest importer of the commodity, the increasing size of the EU could bestow on it 
considerable power to impact prices in the soybeans market through price discrimination.  Past 
studies on the existence of market power in the global soybean market have been limited to the 
export market (Heien and Pick, 1991; Pick and Park, 1991; Deodhar and Sheldon, 1997; 
Schnepf, Doblman and Bolling, 2001), and series of changes have occurred in the soybean 
market since most of these studies were conducted, including the increasing share of Argentina 
and Brazil in the soybean export market and the increase in size of the EU.   
The recent structure of the global soybean import market is examined using the fixed-
effects econometric model and testing Krugman (1987)’s the pricing-to-market hypothesis on 
annual pooled data from 1975 to 2000.  The approach, following Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri 
(2001), enables us to identify market power, if any, in the soybean import market and to estimate 
the impact of exchange rate movements on prices.  Findings from the study will be useful to 
present and prospective investors in the soybean market, along with policy makers, researchers 
and all stakeholders in the import crop market in general.  
The next section provides an overview of recent developments in the world soybean 
market with an emphasis on the exchange rates.  This is followed by a review of previous studies 
on the world soybean market.  The model is developed to test the anti-competitive behavior, 
particularly through practices of pricing-to-market—where trading partners with market power 
adjust prices in their favor given changes in the exchange rates—and price discrimination, in the 
world soybean import market.  Following the discussion of data sources, empirical results are 
presented and discussed.  We find that the EU has been exercising market power through price  3 
discrimination against Argentina and Brazil.  Results of the effects of exchange rates on imports 
prices were mixed, providing inconclusive evidence of the practice of the pricing-to-market.   4 
The World Soybean and Soybean Products Market  
The EU is the world’s largest importer of soybeans and soybean meal, with import value 
shares in 2000 of 31.7 and 46.0 percent, respectively.  Other major importers of soybeans are 
Japan (13 percent), Mexico, and China (8 percent each).  At the same time, the EU is the world’s 
second largest exporter of soybean oil with 21 percent share, and produces a considerable 
amount of soybean meal domestically to make it a net exporter. The EU has been a major trading 
partner of the three major exporting countries of the world: the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.  
With a flat trend in the domestic production, the EU will continue to be a major importer of 
soybean with potentially increasing impact on the world price (USDA, 2001).  
The exchange rate of euro relative to the major exporting countries’ currencies affects 
commodity prices.  The euro depreciated from its introduction rate of $1.16 in January 1999 to 
$0.85 by November 2000.  As a large importing country, depreciation of the EU’s exchange rate 
will increase the price of its imports, since the purchasing power of the domestic currency has 
decreased.  Coupled with the strict Common Agricultural Policy, the devaluation of euro has 
sustained relatively higher domestic prices of agricultural products (particularly soybeans 
products) within the Union.  The exchange rate of the EU currency has been placed under the 
managed system, where the central bank intervenes to maintain the rate within a fixed range. 
The exchange rate situations in major exporting countries have been mixed.  In particular, 
the Argentine currency (peso) has been volatile since the late 1990s.  A number of relatively 
long-standing economic problems in Argentina have converged into an economic crisis by the 
year 2001.  This forced the government to cut off the domestic currency (peso) from its former 
fixed rate of one-to-one with the U.S. dollar in 1991, which depreciated by over 300 percent in 
real terms between 1999 and 2002 (Torgerson, 2002).  Though the devaluation could potentially  5 
benefit the economy as export is boosted, crop production in the country has declined as capital 
flight reduced loan access.  Recent export taxes on soybeans (currently 23.5 percent) and their 
products have dampened the prospect of enhanced export (Torgerson, 2002).  The exchange rate 
situations in Brazil and U.S. have however been relatively stable.   
While Brazil and Argentina’s shares of soybean exports have continued to increase, U.S. 
exports of soybeans and soybean meal have declined in recent years (Ash, 2002) due to a 
marginal growth in domestic soybean meal consumption and relative returns favoring crop 
production shifts towards corn and wheat.  U.S. soybean oil exports continue to increase (Ash, 
2002).   
Previous Studies  
Several research efforts have been made in the past with varying focus and results.  In 
estimating the demand structure for soybean and soybean meal applying the Almost Ideal 
Demand System model to quarterly data between 1976 and 1984, Heien and Pick (1991), found 
that U.S. was no longer the dominant soybean supplier in the world market, and concluded that 
the market is competitive.  Pick and Park (1991) examined the competitive structure of 
agricultural exports from the U.S. using the pricing-to-market model, which incorporated an 
index of exchange rate disparity among countries.  Contrary to Heien and Pick (1991), they 
concluded that the soybean export market was not perfectly competitive with the U.S. as the 
market leader.   
More recently, Deodhar and Sheldon (1997) used the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization approach to determine whether market power exists in the soybean meal export 
market.  They concluded that the market was perfectly competitive over the 1966 -1993 sample 
period.  Schnepf, Doblman, and Bolling (2001) also found that the soybeans export market is  6 
competitive, with Argentina, Brazil and the U.S. being the major competitors, over the 1990-
2000 study period.  
In all, previous studies have focused on the export side of the world soybean and soybean 
products markets and there appears to be a consensus that the export market has been 
competitive, particularly since the 1990s.  However, the competitiveness of the import market 
has not been addressed.  We cannot infer from these previous results on export markets, since the 
import market is distinct.  The dominance of the EU in the global soybean and soybean meal 
import shares underscores the need to ascertain whether the world soybean import market is also 
competitive.  
Soybean Import Market Model 
The pricing-to-market hypothesis (Krugman, 1987) explains a link between prices and 
exchange rate movements.  Trading partners, say exporters, can exercise market power by 
adjusting prices sold to different markets in their favor when exchange rates defining the terms-
of-trades change.  Consequently, the transaction prices do not fully reflect the changes in the 
exchange rates.  By testing whether the exchange rate changes are completely passed through to 
transaction prices, the presence of market power through pricing-to-market practices can be 
identified. 
Knetter (1989) builds the following model to test the exchange-rate pass-through to 
examine competitiveness in an export market.  From the first order condition of the profit 
maximization problem of the exporter, the export price to market i at time t can be derived in the 
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, where  it ε  is the price elasticity of demand facing the 
exporter in market i and  t c  is the marginal cost.  If the market is competitive with no market 
power intervention, the export price would evolve independent of exchange rate changes.  The  7 
exporter with market power may set discriminatory prices across different markets based on 
price elasticity of demand.  Otherwise, the export price should be equal across the markets.  
Knetter (1989) proposes regressing the export price on the exchange rate between the exporter 
and importer’s currency (e), with country-specific effect ( i λ ) to capture price discrimination: 
(1) ln ln it t i i it it pe θλ βµ =++ +  
where  t θ  measures trend in marginal costs,  i β  is the parameter for the exchange rate effect, and 
it µ  is the error term.  A perfectly competitive market structure corresponds to the case where  i λ  
and  i β  both equal zero.   i β ≠ 0 implies the presence of pricing-to-market practices, and  i λ ≠ 0 
implies price discrimination.   
Knetter’s model has been used to identify the presence of market power and price 
discrimination in the soybean export market in previous studies (Pick and Park, 1991; Abbort et 
al., 1993; Yumkella et al. , 1994; Deodhar and Sheldon, 1997).  Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri 
(2001) applied the model to vanilla importers.  We follow their approach to examine the 
competitiveness of the soybean products market and forms of anti-competitive behavior by the 
EU.  
The profit function of the EU, which imports soybeans from n countries and produces 
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where p is the price of output, say soybean oil, qi represents the quantity of soybeans imported 
from country i,  () f ⋅  is the production function, L and K are labor and capital,  i r  is the price of 
soybeans imported from country i, and w and c are factor prices of labor and capital.  The first 
order condition that maximizes (2) is:  8 
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where  MPP is the marginal physical product of soybeans.  Since soybeans are relatively 
homogeneous, MPP should not differ significantly across sources (i.e., MPPi = MPP for all i).  If 
the EU exercises market power through price discrimination based on differences in import 
supply elasticities, the price paid for soybeans from various sources could differ.  If market 
power is exercised in the form of pricing-to-market, import price movements should reflect the 
changes in corresponding exchange rates.  Thus, Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri (2001) suggest the 
following regression model to test for the presence of market power in an import market:  
(5) ln ln ln i t ti tii ti t rp e θλα βµ =++ + +  
where, as before,  t θ  measures trend in the marginal physical product,  i λ  are country-specific 
terms,  i β  is the parameter for the exchange rate effect,  it µ  is the error term, and α  is the 
parameter for the output price. 
A non-zero relationship between the exchange rates and import prices ( 0 β ≠ ) suggests 
an incomplete exchange rate pass through, where the EU is exercising market power towards 
their suppliers.  If the EU practices price discrimination across their suppliers, we expect 
country-specific terms to be different from zero ( 0 i λ ≠ ).  The parameter on the output price is 
expected to be positive, given the first-order condition. 
In addition, import prices may be affected by the changes in the EU during the period of 
analysis.  The EU has grown in 1986—when Spain and Portugal joined—and 1995—when  9 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined.  Moreover, euro was fully adopted in 1999.  These changes 
may affect the import prices through changes in soybean production technology within the Union 
or market power, and are therefore included in the estimated model.  
Data 
Quantity and value data spanning from 1975 through 2000 on soybeans, soybean meal 
and soybean oil imports (by EU-15) and exports (from U.S., Brazil and Argentina) were 
collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization.  From these, unit values for the different 
products were computed as import price proxies.  Nominal and real exchange rate figures on the 
three exporting countries and the EU-15 for the same period were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Also, the consumer price index for the EU-15 (USDA) was 
used to deflate the nominal prices into 2000 euro terms. 
To account for the changes in the size of the EU, two dummy variables are introduced.  The first 
(D1) equals one from 1986 through 2000 and zero otherwise, while the second (D2) equals one 
from 1995 through 2000 and zero otherwise.  To capture the impact of full adoption of the EU 
euro, a binary variable EURO is specified to equal one for 1999 and 2000, and zero otherwise.  
The U.S. is specified as the base of country-specific effects.  Soybean meal and soybean oil were 
separately considered as outputs of soybeans, and the model was estimated using the nominal 
and real exchange rates and price series, respectively.   
Prior to the estimation, correlation between import prices from Brazil and Argentina and 
autocorrelation were detected in the data.  Thus, the model is estimated by the Park’s method 
using the PROC TSCSREG program in SAS, which corrects for heteroskedasticity, first order 
autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation to yield consistent parameter estimates in 
panel data analysis.  Although the Park’s method has been reported to underestimate the standard  10 
error covariances when compared to ordinary least squares when the number of cross sectional 
units is close to the number of observations of the cross sectional units, the period considered in 
the study is sufficiently long to annul this effect.   
Results 
Table 1 shows the results based on the nominal exchange rates and nominal prices, for 
the cases where soybean meal and oil are considered as the output, respectively.  Country effects 
are statistically significant in both cases, suggesting that the EU has discriminated against 
soybean imports from Argentina and Brazil relative to the counterparts from the U.S.  Perhaps 
there may be a difference in product or service quality (e.g., transportation, payment methods) 
that is beyond the scope of the present study.  Otherwise, the results suggest that import supply 
from Argentina and Brazil are more inelastic than the U.S.  The effects of the exchange rate are 
statistically not different from zero, implying that the exchange rate pass through is complete on 
average.  Thus, the EU exercises market power in the soybean import market through price 
discrimination but not through pricing-to-market practices. 
In line with a priori expectation, the output effects are positive and statistically 
significant. The output price estimates indicate that a one percent increase in soybean meal and 
soybean oil prices causes the imported soybean price to increase by 0.75 percent and 0.68 
percent, respectively.  In the soybean oil case, the trend effect is statistically significant, 
suggesting that marginal physical product of soybean has increased over the sample period due 
to improved milling technology.  The full adoption of euro in 1999 did not have a statistically 
significant impact on the import price.  The changes in the size of the EU, however, are 
estimated to have impacted soybean import prices.  Particularly, it is estimated that the size 
change in 1986 significantly lowered the import prices.  The size change in 1995 had no  11 
significant impact on soybean imports, likely because Finland, Austria, and Sweden are not 
major soybean importers.  
The regression results with real price and exchange rates are presented in Table 2.  A 
major change from the results based on nominal series is that the exchange rate effects are 
estimated to be statistically significant in the case using soybean meal.  The results imply that a 
one percent devaluation of the Argentine peso, Brazilian real and the U.S. dollars, ceteris 
paribus, results in 0.241, 0.244, and 0.237 percent reduction in the euro import price of the 
soybeans, respectively. This implies that about 0.76 percent of the one percent devaluation is 
passed through to prices denominated in the local currencies of the exporting countries.  The 
similar results for Brazil and Argentina may partially be accounted for by the correlation 
between the exchange rates of the two countries, besides comparable market share and prices due 
to geographic proximity and production technologies.   
Morever, larger country effects are estimated for the soybean oil model with real price 
series.  Our results consistently suggest the EU’s price discrimination against Argentina and 
Brazil soybean imports relative to the U.S.  The signs and magnitudes of the estimated trend 
effect, output price effect, and the effect of EU’s size changes remain similar to those based on 
the nominal series.  The change in the EU membership in 1986 apparently depressed the import 
price. 
As noted by Rakotorisoa and Shapouri (2001), it is important to note that unlike the 
model which aggregates trading activities to national levels, individual firms in practice 
dominate the soybean market, and our results should be interpreted with caution.  This is 
particularly worth emphasizing because exchange rate adjustments may not be specific to 
commodity price movements as assumed in the model.  12 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper studies the recent international soybeans market and examines the effects of 
exchange rate movements on prices of soybeans imported by the EU from the three major 
exporting countries.  The fixed effects econometric model was applied to investigate the 
presence of the EU’s market power exercised through pricing-to-market practices and price 
discrimination in the world soybean import market.  
Results show the existence of price discrimination in the import market against Argentina 
and Brazil, relative to the U.S.  This confirms that the soybean import market structure is not 
competitive, contrary to the recent findings of competitiveness in the export market.  The 
evidence of pricing-to-market practices was mixed.  The nominal exchange rate effects were not 
significant for both soybean meal and oil, while the real exchange rate effects were significant 
for the soybean meal.  The introduction of the euro may relatively be too new to make any 
appreciable impact in this respect.  Another revelation of the study is that the size of the EU 
seems to have a depressing effect on the soybean import price. This suggests that appreciable 
impact could be expected in the future, with the approved membership of ten countries  
It is important to note that while this study has laid a solid foundation for further study of 
the soybeans import market, policy implications of our results require a better understanding of 
the intricacies of the market.  Since the EU has become the largest trading bloc in the world, its 
trade and agricultural policies impact price determination in multiple global markets.  Any anti-
competitive behavior is bound to elicit retaliatory actions from other trading parties, particularly 
those with substantial bargaining powers like the U.S.  Future studies could also examine how 
the present findings might change if Japan, the world’s second largest importer of soybeans, is 
incorporated into the model in a duopsony setting.     13 
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Table 1  Regression Results Using Nominal Prices and Exchange Rates (Dependent variable is  
soybean import price; output considered is (a) soybean meal and (b) soybean oil) 
 
        Intercept         Trend      Country    Exchange rate    EU size    Output price     euro 
                                Effect       effect        effect                   effect         effect           effect    
(a) Soybean meal [R
2= 0. 64]                 Nominal                                                                 
 
         -0. 387*        -0. 006                                                                       0. 685*       -0. 012                             
         (0. 120)         (0. 004)                                                                     (0. 077)       (0. 060) 
Arg                                          -0. 064*      -0. 002 
                                                 (0. 024)       (0. 002) 
Bra                                           -0. 027**    -0. 000 
                                                 (0. 014)       (0. 001) 
USA                                                             0. 014 
                                                                    (0. 042) 
D1                                                                                         -0.157* 
                                                                                              (0. 047) 
D2                                                                                          0. 009                                                                 
                                                                                              (0. 040)                       
 
(b) Soybean oil [R
2= 0. 64]                                                                                                         
 
         -0. 3166          0. 007**                                                                   0. 753*        0. 012                             
          (0. 133)         (0. 004)                                                                    (0. 090)       (0. 067) 
Arg                                          -0. 066*       -0. 002 
                                                (0. 024)        (0. 002) 
Bra                                           -0. 029**    -0. 001 
                                                 (0. 013)       (0. 001) 
USA                                                             0. 004 
                                                                     (0. 039) 
D1                                                                                       -0. 197* 
                                                                                           (0. 047) 
D2                                                                                        0. 017                                                                 
                                                                                           (0. 040)                  
 
Note :   * indicates significance at 1% level.  
** indicates significance at 5% level.  
*** indicates significance at 10% level.  
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.  
 
 
  16 
Table 2  Regression Results Using Real Prices and Exchange Rates (Dependent variable is 
soybean import price; output considered is (a) soybean meal and (b) soybean oil) 
 
        Intercept         Trend      country    Exchange rate    EU change   Output price   euro 
                                Effect       effect        effect                   effect         effect           effect .   
(a) Soybean meal [R
2= 0. 97]                 Nominal                                                                 
 
         -0.174**      -0.001                                                                       0.742*         0.024                             
         (0.086)         (0.006)                                                                     (0.091)        (0.063) 
Arg                                          -0.043**        0.241**   
                                               (0.022)         (0.102) 
Bra                                          -0.020**        0.244** 
                                               (0.010)         (0.092) 
USA                                                              0.237** 
                                                                     (0.097) 
D1                                                                                        -0.183* 
                                                                                           (0.052) 
D2                                                                                         0.029                                                                 
                                                                                            (0.045)                     
 (b) Soybean oil [R
2= 0. 98]                                                                                                         
 
         0.008            0.006                                                                       1.005*         -0.041                             
        (0.045)         (0.004)                                                                     (0.060)         (0.042) 
Arg                                          -0.177*       -0.029   
                                               (0.032)         (0.059) 
Bra                                          -0.168*       -0.005 
                                               (0.028)         (0.056) 
USA                                                              0.024 
                                                                     (0.078) 
D1                                                                                         -0.107** 
                                                                                              (0.045) 
D2                                                                                         -0.017                                                                 
                                                                                              (0.038)                     
 
Note :   * indicates significance at 1% level.  
** indicates significance at 5% level.  
*** indicates significance at 10% level.  
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.  
 
 